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FOUR REASONS TO TEACH 
PSYCHOLOGY TO LEGAL WRITING 
STUDENTS 
 
Lawrence M. Solan* 
 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2002, Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist then teaching at 
Princeton University, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics.1 
Much of his distinguished work was co-authored with his late 
colleague, Amos Tversky. Their seminal paper, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,2 has generated a huge progeny 
of work, underlying the field of behavioral economics, and, as 
applied to legal contexts, behavioral law and economics.3 The 
fundamental premise is a simple one: people routinely use 
intellectual shortcuts to simulate the results of logical reasoning, 
saving time and reducing cognitive load.4 But the speed with 
which we employ these rule-of-thumb approaches to everyday life, 
often called heuristics in the literature, comes with a price. 
                                                          
* Don Forchelli Professor of Law and Director, Center for the Study of Law, 
Language and Cognition, Brooklyn Law School. This paper is the result of 
conversations with Marilyn Walter and Elizabeth Fajans, to whom I owe a debt 
of gratitude. I also thank Julie Gainsburg and Sam Glucksberg for valuable 
discussion about the psychological mechanisms discussed below. The research 
for this essay was supported by a dean’s summer research stipend from 
Brooklyn Law School. 
1 The Sveriges Riskbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred 
Nobel 2002, NOBEL PRIZE, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/ 
economic-sciences/laureates/2002/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2013). 
2 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). 
3 A search of the legal database LEXIS shows more than 1,325 citations to 
this article in law journals as of July 11, 2013. 
4 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 2. 
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Employing heuristics leads to systematic errors in judgment: Not 
so many errors that we have reason to abandon the strategies in the 
first place, but noticeable propensities to choose one approach over 
others that could yield better-reasoned outcomes.5 These 
propensities are called biases, which are the side effects of the 
heuristics that we use so routinely and mostly to good ends.6 
Both sides of the coin—the heuristics and the biases alike—
come into play in legal reasoning. To take one well-studied 
example, “the endowment effect” has been demonstrated in a 
variety of circumstances to show that people tend to value what 
they have more than they value what they do not have but would 
like to have.7 Thus, transactions, whether for goods, services, or 
the resolution of disputes by settlement, become harder in these 
circumstances. The person who must give something up is likely to 
assign greater value to what she has than does the other party to the 
deal. Understanding this bias, which is the flip side of the strategy 
of holding on to what you already have, can empower mediators 
and others to facilitate transactions, increasing efficiency in 
commerce, and reducing transaction costs. 
What does this have to do with teaching or learning legal 
writing skills? To the extent that these heuristics and biases play 
themselves out in contexts that generate legal documents, it would 
be irresponsible for the writer not to adjust the content and style of 
what he says to take into account what will most likely influence 
the reader, while also overcoming his own propensity to reason 
and/or to present information ineffectively. Whether the audience 
is a judge, a client, a boss, or an opposing lawyer, maximum 
attention to what is likely to have persuasive force is the writer’s 
goal. Add to these audiences the writer’s own set of biases, which 
                                                          
5 See id. 
6 Id. Daniel Kahneman outlines the theory in an accessible way in his book. 
See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
7 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment 
Effect and the Coase Theorum, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990). Recent research 
suggests that this effect is not uniform across circumstances and may not be the 
result of a single preference. Thus, while it is a robust phenomenon, care must 
be taken not to overstate it or to oversimplify its explanation. See Gregory Klass 
& Kathryn Zieler, Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and 
Legal Scholarship, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
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should always be monitored closely, and it becomes clear that the 
writer has a lot of psychology to keep in mind. 
Fortunately, some of this psychology is relatively intuitive and 
is already the subject of legal writing courses that never mention 
advances in cognitive and social psychology. For example, this 
essay later discusses the “confirmation bias,” the propensity to 
seek out and value evidence that reinforces conclusions we have 
already reached.8 Law students are already being taught to avoid 
this temptation and to make sure that they answer the other side’s 
arguments, whether in an initial brief or in a rebuttal.9 So why do 
legal writing students need to be explicitly instructed in 
overcoming this bias when they are being taught its substance 
without any mention of psychological literature? I suggest two 
answers to this question.  
The first is purely pedagogical. Students are resistant to being 
bossed around. Legal writing classes can be emotionally trying as 
students are told quite specifically one thing after another that they 
need to change in order to become even adequate legal writers. As 
suggested below, teaching the psychology behind the command 
that they take the other side’s arguments seriously helps to convert 
the instructor from a boss to a person sharing valuable information 
that can help the student.10 This, in turn, depersonalizes subsequent 
criticism of the student’s work since everyone is starting from the 
same baseline: the dangerous temptation to undervalue and thereby 
ignore opposing views that the reader may find convincing. 
The second answer is that an understanding of these 
psychological processes adds a level of subtlety to the skills the 
students acquire. They are not the only ones who suffer from 
confirmation bias. We all do. Learning about this bias should 
motivate the student—and subsequently the lawyer, we hope—to 
scan the writing of others for signs that they, too, have failed to 
take seriously enough convincing arguments, and to exploit this 
failure to their clients’ ends. Moreover, it is neither pleasant nor 
unusual to appear before a judge who simply does not like your 
                                                          
8 See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous 
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998). 
9 See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.  
10 See infra Part III.A. 
10 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
case right from the beginning. This does not mean that the judge 
has made up his mind once and for all. It does mean, however, that 
you will have counter the judge’s initial assessment in a manner 
that is especially salient. After all, judges are human too. By 
teaching students to understand the psychological phenomena that 
underlie some of the basic strategies of good legal writing, legal 
writing instructors may help students to internalize more of what 
they learn in legal writing classes. This will make it more likely 
that they will be able to transfer the skills to tasks performed in 
their legal careers.  
Part II of this essay briefly examines some relevant advances in 
educational psychology and explores the benefits of teaching legal 
writing students about heuristics and biases. Part III analyzes four 
cognitive biases that grow out of strategies we use successfully in 
our everyday lives and argues that the description of each of them 
has a valuable place in the legal writing classroom. These are the 
four reasons to which the title of this essay refers. In order, they 
are: the bias toward concluding that people who write simply are 
smarter; the confirmation bias discussed above; the 
correspondence bias, which causes us to overstate the contribution 
of a person’s character and to understate the context in which 
people act as explanations of people’s actions; and the bias blind 
spot, which prevents us from taking our own biases as seriously as 
we do the biases of others. Part IV is a brief conclusion, which 
makes particular recommendations to educators for including some 
of the psychological research into their legal writing courses.  
 
II.   INTERNALLY MOTIVATED LEARNING 
 
People tend to learn better when they are intrinsically 
motivated than when they learn for the sake of pleasing others in 
order to achieve external validation.11 What does it mean to have 
learned “better?” Surely, if you tell a student that using simple, 
straightforward language is likely to be more effective than using 
                                                          
11 See Edward L. Deci et al., Motivation and Education: The Self-
Determination Perspective, 26 EDUC. PSYCHOL. 325, 331–32 (1991); Richard 
M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic 
Definitions and New Directions, 25 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 54, 54–59 
(2000).  
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gobbledygook, the student will understand the concept more or less 
regardless of how you convey it. That is an important first step. 
What legal educators really care about, however, is not only that 
students can take the directive and apply it to the writing 
assignments in the course, but that they will later transfer their 
success in completing the course assignments to the real world of 
legal practice, and become good legal writers. After all, creating 
good legal writers is why we care so much about having good legal 
writing programs in law schools in the first place.  
Educational psychologists refer to the process of acquiring the 
skill that enables one to apply learned knowledge to new situations 
as the “transfer of learning.”12 It is the key to successful 
professional training. The key, in turn, to enabling the transfer is 
for students to “learn with understanding.”13 Psychologist John 
Bransford and his colleagues have shown that people are better 
able to transfer what they have learned when they understand both 
the concepts presented to them and the mechanisms that underlie 
the concepts they have acquired. Simply memorizing the facts does 
not effectively produce transfer.14 To illustrate, Bransford and his 
colleague Daniel Schwartz found that university students were 
better able to apply knowledge that they learned in a lecture when, 
prior to the lecture, they had engaged in analyzing various 
contrasting cases, than when prior to the lecture they had merely 
read about the relevant phenomena.15 This is not to say that 
educators should abandon teaching content in favor of how to find 
content. Rather, Bransford’s point is that when people understand 
what it is they are trying to do and why, it becomes more likely 
that they will internalize the learning well enough to apply it to 
new situations, and thus maximize the benefits of the work they 
did learning the material in the first place. 
                                                          
12 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM’N BEHAVIORAL & SOC. SCI., HOW 
PEOPLE LEARN: BRAIN, MIND, EXPERIENCE, AND SCHOOL 51 (John Bransford et 
al. eds., 2d ed. 2000).  
13 Id. at 5, 16, 24.  
14 See id. at 55–56; see also John D. Bransford & Daniel L. Schwartz, 
Rethinking Transfer: A Simple Proposal with Multiple Implications, 24 REV. 
RES. EDUC. 61, 77 (1999). 
15 Daniel L. Schwartz & John D. Bransford, A Time for Telling, 16 
COGNITION & INSTRUCTION 475 (1998).  
12 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Consistent with Bransford’s work, other researchers have 
found that people learn better when they are internally motivated to 
learn than when they learn for the sake of earning rewards and 
avoiding punishment. Important among these psychological 
contributions is the Self-Determination Theory, developed 
principally by psychologists Edward L. Deci and Richard M. 
Ryan.16 The concept is simple: “When intrinsically motivated a 
person is moved to act for the fun or challenge entailed rather than 
because of external prods, pressures, or rewards.”17 Studies 
conducted by Deci and his colleagues show that internal 
motivation produces better results not only in education, but in the 
workplace as well.18 Research also focuses on the differences 
among external motivational factors, some of which may be more 
beneficial than others in learning environments,19 and on ways of 
promoting the internalization of motivations that begin 
externally.20 For example, fear of parental sanctions and a belief it 
will make a student more likely to launch a career successfully are 
both potential external motivations for doing one’s homework. The 
latter motivation, though, is obviously more consistent with 
building autonomy and more susceptible to internalization.21 
The value of independent motivation has been tested in 
research on legal education. Studies conducted by Kennon Sheldon 
(a psychology professor) and Lawrence Krieger (a law professor) 
demonstrate not only higher GPAs by first-year law students who 
show higher measures of self-determination, but also that engaging 
in activity because one is internally motivated to do so produces a 
greater sense of well-being than doing something in response to 
                                                          
16 See Deci et al., supra note 11, at 325; Ryan & Deci, supra note 11, at 55.  
17 Ryan & Deci, supra note 11, at 56. 
18 See Marylène Gagné & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory and 
Work Motivation, 26 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 331, 345–47 (2005) (reporting 
on studies showing that when supervisors are trained to give workers a greater 
sense of autonomy, the workers report greater job satisfaction and greater trust 
in the organization for which they work). 
19 Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Internal 
Motivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105 (1971). 
20 Id. 
21 Ryan & Deci, supra note 11, at 60. 
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external motivation.22 Sheldon and Krieger find that law students 
begin their legal education with as good a sense of well-being and 
internal motivation as other college graduates.23 However, both 
this sense of well-being and this measure of internal motivation 
deteriorate during the first year of law school24 and more or less 
remain at this depressed level throughout the remainder of law 
school.25  
Sheldon and Krieger’s studies further demonstrate a strong 
negative correlation between the extent to which law students 
reflect a sense of self-determination, of which internal motivation 
plays a significant role, and the extent to which they demonstrate 
negative physical and psychological symptoms. Notably, the 
authors observe that this correlation “is consistent with much 
previous self-determination theory research, which indicates that 
people perform more persistently, flexibly, creatively, and 
effectively when they act for intrinsic and self-determined 
reasons.”26 The lessons from all of these studies are clear: When 
we have the sense that we are in control of our lives, we feel better; 
when our goals are more oriented toward promoting the values that 
are meaningful to us, we learn better. 
In the next section, this essay will show how psychological 
research into heuristics and biases explains some basic tenets of 
good legal writing and legal advocacy more generally. Teaching 
the research that underlies these advocacy skills, even briefly, may 
well have the effect of helping students to internalize the lessons, 
making the students less resistant and more likely to apply what 
they learn in the classroom and beyond. 
                                                          
22 Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Does Legal Education 
Have Undermining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, 
Values, and Well-Being, 22 BEHAV. SCI. &  L. 261, 261 (2004). 
23 Id. at 271. 
24 Id. at 272–74. 
25 Id. at 274. 
26 Id. at 281. Professor Emily Zimmerman makes reference to much of the 
literature cited here, using it to develop “vitality” as a measurable state of mind 
that produces more positive experience among law students. Id.  For further 
discussion of these findings, see Emily Zimmerman, An Interdisciplinary 
Framework for Understanding and Cultivating Law Student Enthusiasm, 58 
DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 884–92 (2009). 
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III. FOUR LESSONS OF PSYCHOLOGY TO TEACH TO LEGAL WRITING 
STUDENTS 
 
A. Learning to Write Simply and Understanding Why It Is 
Important to Do So  
 
One of the tasks of legal writing instruction is to convince 
students to write clearly using simple, straightforward language. In 
fact, Bryan Garner, a leading expert on legal writing and the editor 
of Black’s Law Dictionary, goes so far as to call his text on legal 
writing, Legal Writing in Plain English.27 There is no secret as to 
why one should write in language that is clear and simple enough 
to understand easily: Plain writing is more likely to accomplish the 
goal of persuading the reader of the writer’s position. Legal writing 
texts say as much, and attempt to convince students of this fact.28  
Students are more likely to internalize the strategy of simple, 
plain writing if they understand why they should employ that 
strategy than if they adopt the strategy merely to get a good grade. 
This pedagogical lesson follows directly from the literature 
described in the previous section and is part of the intuitive arsenal 
that effective teachers possess in any event. Yet students still need 
to be convinced that simple writing is better writing, especially 
when it comes down to small words being better than big ones. 
High school students preparing for the SAT are often taught to 
associate a large vocabulary with intelligence and success in 
school. This lesson runs counter to the preference for 
straightforward, simple writing. Prior to beginning their legal 
education, some students have learned good writing skills in 
                                                          
27 BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH: A TEXT WITH 
EXERCISES (2001). 
28 See RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. & SHEILA SIMON, LEGAL WRITING 148 
(2008); TERRILL POLLMAN ET AL., LEGAL WRITING: EXAMPLES & 
EXPLANATIONS 294–300 (2011); HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND 
ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 229–44 (5th ed. 2008) (advising students to use syntax 
that results in simple, straightforward sentence structure). Pollman et al. focus 
on making writing more concise, but virtually all of their advice to students is to 
shorten passages by making them simpler, both syntactically and with respect to 
vocabulary. 
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college, while others have not.  
Telling students that simple writing is more effective takes us 
only part of the way toward internal motivation. It is far more 
effective than commanding, as a matter of fiat, that students write 
in a simple manner. But it still requires students to act because they 
trust their teacher’s warning that a plain writing style will assist 
them some time in the future. There is nothing wrong with trusting 
one’s teacher, or for that matter, trusting Bryan Garner. But by 
providing an introduction to the psychological mechanisms that 
lead to people appreciating plain writing, legal writing instructors 
can create a more direct link between the goal of training law 
students to write clearly and persuasively on the one hand, and the 
student’s motivation for achieving that goal, on the other. 
Moreover, the psychology of appreciating simple writing is 
interesting in its own right. Psychologist Daniel Oppenheimer has 
published studies that explain the phenomenon in terms of 
processing fluency.29 When a passage is more difficult to process 
than we believe it should be, we react negatively to the author. In 
one of the studies, graduate students were given three versions of 
essays written for admission to the English Department graduate 
program at Stanford University: the original essay, that essay made 
more complex by substituting a longer word taken from a 
thesaurus for every third content word in the essay (moderate 
complexity), and the essay made even more complex by 
substituting a longer word for every content word in the essay 
(high complexity). A number of graduate school application essays 
were used in this study. Below is one of the essays in all three 
versions: I have highlighted the altered words in the moderate and 




I want to go to Graduate School so that I can learn 
to know literature well. I want to explore the shape 
and the meaning of the novel and its literary 
                                                          
29 Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Consequences of Erudite Vernacular Utilized 
Irrespective of Necessity: Problems with Using Long Words Needlessly, 20 
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 139 (2006). 
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antecedents. I want to understand what the novel 
has meant in different literary periods, and what it is 
likely to become. I want to explore its different 
forms, realism, naturalism and other modes and the 
Victorian and Modernist consciousness as they are 
revealed. 
 
Moderate complexity (every 3rd applicable word lengthened): 
 
I want to go to Graduate School so that I can learn 
to recognize literature well. I want to explore the 
character and the meaning of the novel and its 
literary antecedents. I desire to understand what the 
novel has represented in different literary periods, 
and what it is likely to become. I desire to explore 
its different manners, realism, naturalism and other 
modes, and the Victorian and Modernist 
consciousness as they are revealed. 
 
High complexity (every applicable word lengthened): 
 
I desire to go to Graduate School so that I can learn 
to recognize literature satisfactorily. I want to 
investigate the character and the connotation of 
the narrative and its literary antecedents. I desire 
to comprehend what the narrative has 
represented in numerous literary periods, and 
what it is expected to become. I desire to 
investigate its numerous manners, realism, 
naturalism, and other approaches, and the 
Victorian and Modernist consciousness as they are 
discovered.30 
 
Participants were asked to rate the comprehensibility of the 
passages (each participant received only one version), to make a 
judgment of admission (yes or no), and to indicate the level of 
confidence in the admission decision (1–7). Admission decisions 
                                                          
30 Id. at 154–55 (emphasis added). 
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were then scored as ranging from definitely reject (-7) to definitely 
accept (+7).31 
The results are striking. Participants voted to accept the 
applicant who wrote the original essay significantly more often 
than the one who wrote the moderately complex essay, who was in 
turn considered more worthy of admission than the author of the 
highly complex version. Moreover, statistical analysis showed that 
comprehensibility mediated both complexity (original, moderately 
complex, highly complex) and decisions to admit or not admit. In 
other words, the harder it is to understand a passage, the less we 
think of the ability of the person writing it, and the more complex 
the passage turns out to be.32 This, at least preliminarily, confirms 
the hypothesis that processing fluency affects our reaction to 
written texts.  
These results were confirmed in another study in which 
participants were asked to rate the intelligence of Ph.D. students on 
a 1–7 scale based on the abstracts of their dissertations. They were 
also asked to rate the difficulty of the passage, also on a 1–7 scale. 
This time, however, instead of substituting complex language for 
more simple language, Oppenheimer substituted shorter words for 
longer words contained in the original abstract. Every word of nine 
letters or more was replaced by the second-shortest word in the 
Microsoft Word 2000 thesaurus listing for the longer word. The 
results were similar. Those reading the simpler version thought that 
the author was more intelligent (4.80 vs. 4.26).33   
In yet another experiment, Oppenheimer presented participants 
with one of two translations of a meditation by René Descartes that 
they were not likely to have already seen. One was translated into 
relatively simple English, while the other used a lot of big words. 
Participants were asked to judge both the intelligence of the author 
on a 1–7 scale, and the difficulty of the passage on a 1–7 scale. 
Half the participants were told that the piece they read was written 
by Descartes, the other half told that it came from an anonymous 
author. The results: People rated the author of the simpler version 
as more intelligent, whether or not they knew in advance that 
                                                          
31 Id. at 141. 
32 Id. at 141–42. 
33 Id. at 147. 
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Descartes was the author.34  
What are the lessons for legal writing students?  
1. The experiment based on graduate school 
application essays shows that making language 
more complex leads to people thinking less of 
the writer. One may argue that the larger words, 
taken from the thesaurus, were not all used 
aptly; but 
2. The experiment based on the dissertation 
abstracts shows that using simpler words makes 
the author seem more intelligent, even though 
this time, it was the simpler language that might 
not always be apt; and  
3. Our opinions, even of famous people, rise and 
fall depending on whether their writing seems 
simple and straightforward. 
One can argue that using small words is only part of plain, 
simple writing, and that is true.35 But the larger message is clear 
enough: People do not like to be made to struggle with the 
language they read, and complex language reduces processing 
fluency, making them struggle. Moreover, these facts are the 
opposite of what we tend to believe. As Oppenheimer puts it: 
[It] seems that people’s naive theories of fluency 
tend to lead them to negatively associate complexity 
and intelligence. This has some interesting 
ramifications. The most straightforward of these is 
that authors should avoid needless complexity. As 
reported in the introduction of this paper, a vast 
majority of Stanford students use a strategy of 
complexity when writing papers and this is 
                                                          
34 On the 1–7 scale, 6.5 vs. 5.6 for those who knew the author was 
Descartes, and 4.7 vs. 4.0 for those who were told that the author was an 
anonymous writer. Id. at 144. 
35 One may be concerned that the use of longer words is not an adequate 
proxy for excessively complex writing styles, which often include convoluted 
syntax and very lengthy sentences. The conclusion of this essay makes 
suggestions to legal writing instructors who would like to make Oppenheimer’s 
point through examples that are complex in ways other than word length. See 
infra text accompanying notes 85–87. 
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undoubtedly true at campuses and businesses across 
the country. However, this research shows that such 
strategies tend to backfire. This finding could be 
broadly applied to help people improve their 
writing, and receive more positive evaluations of 
their work.36 
These lessons are not remote from what is taught right now. 
Nonetheless, the research into educational psychology discussed 
earlier in this essay suggests that legal writing students would 
benefit from being made aware of the mechanisms that underlie the 
mandate that they write simply. This would allow the students to 
internalize the principles more strongly, perform better, and have 
the satisfaction of learning for the sake of becoming part of a 
community of writers who know what it means to work in a world 
in which human frailty demands that we write clearly and 
straightforwardly if we wish our ideas to influence others. 
 
B. Overcoming the Confirmation Bias 
 
Consider this terrible mistake that lawyers sometimes make: 
Lawyers get so caught up in their clients’ positions that they 
become unable to stand back and see what is reasonable in the 
opposition’s argument. Then, when the lawyers finally see the 
merits of the other side (if they ever do), it is too late. The judge 
has ruled against their client for failure to rebut decent arguments 
from the other side. The tendency to fall into this trap is the result 
of our being biased in favor of confirming beliefs that we already 
hold. This is, sensibly enough, called the confirmation bias. 
Psychologist Raymond Nickerson describes it as follows: 
People tend to seek information that they consider 
supportive of favored hypotheses or existing beliefs 
and to interpret information in ways that are partial 
to those hypotheses or beliefs. Conversely, they 
tend not to seek and perhaps even to avoid 
information that would be considered 
counterindicative with respect to those hypotheses 
or beliefs and supportive of alternative 
                                                          
36 Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 152. 
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possibilities.37 
We all do this. We become overconfident that we are right 
once we take a stand, even if we were open-minded to begin with. 
That happens because we tend to close our minds to disconfirming 
evidence. 
Of course, legal writing experts tell students and lawyers to 
take into account the position of the opposing party. Justice 
Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner put it in military terms: “No 
general engages the enemy without a battle plan based in large part 
on what the enemy is expected to do. Your case must take into 
account the points the other side is likely to make.”38 A leading 
text on trial advocacy also discusses the strategy of blunting the 
opposition’s case in opening argument.39 This essay suggests that 
if students are made aware of the mechanisms that underlie the 
confirmation bias, they are likely to do a better job internalizing 
the lesson they are taught and to transfer this knowledge to 
situations beyond what they learn in the writing course. 
Before discussing the likelihood of confirmation bias in 
confrontational situations, consider this classic demonstration of 
our propensity to focus on confirming evidence whether or not we 
have any emotional or intellectual ties to the result. The task was 
developed by British psychologist Peter Wason. Below is a 
presentation of the task from an article that Wason co-authored 
with his colleague Philip Johnson-Laird:40  
You are presented with four cards showing, 
respectively, “A,” “D,” “4,” “7,” and you know 
from previous experience that every card, of which 
these are a subset, has a letter on one side and a 
number on the other side. You are then given this 
rule about the four cards in front of you: If a card 
has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number 
on the other side. Next you are told: “Your task is to 
say which of the cards you need to turn over in 
                                                          
37 Nickerson, supra note 8, at 177 (citation omitted). 
38 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART 
OF PERSUADING JUDGES 10 (2008).  
39 See THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES (9th ed. 2013). 
40 P.N. Johnson-Laird & P.C. Wason, A Theoretical Analysis of Insight into 
a Reasoning Task, 1 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 134 (1970). 
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order to find out whether the rule is true or false.”41 
The correct answers are “A” and “7.” But that is not how most 
people respond. Almost everyone gets the “A” right, but some 
people choose “4” in addition to “A” and others stop with “A.”42 
The reason is that turning over the A can tell you either that the 
statement is true (if you get an even number) or false (if you get an 
odd one). But turning over the “7” can only falsify the statement if 
the other side contains a vowel. It cannot confirm the hypothesis 
with a consonant. People tend to miss reasoning that can falsify a 
theory but cannot confirm it.43 
Now consider this experiment that more closely illustrates 
confirmation bias in real-life situations. John Darley and Padgett 
Gross video recorded a fourth-grade girl named Hannah seemingly 
taking a standardized academic test.44 Before watching Hannah 
take the test, half of the experimental participants watched a 
sequence of her in a low-income urban area, while the other half 
watched a sequence of her in a middle-class suburban setting. A 
control group saw Hannah in one of these two settings but did not 
watch her take the test. The test-taking sequence showed her 
sometimes concentrating, sometimes distracted, and was intended 
to be interpretable in various ways. Participants were then asked, 
among other things, to assess Hannah’s grade level on the various 
                                                          
41 Id. at 134–35 (emphasis omitted). The cards pictured here are 
downloaded from Google Images. The curious reader can see that there are 
many versions of the set online, suggesting that this experiment is indeed very 
famous. 
42 Id. at 136. Ninety percent of participants chose the “A,” whether alone, 
or in combination with other letters.   
43 The “4” is a red herring. It looks like it can confirm the theory, but it 
really cannot do so, because there the theory will hold whether there is a vowel 
or a consonant on the other side.   
44 John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in 
Labeling Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20 (1983). 
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subjects tested. 
The results clearly demonstrate confirmation bias. The control 
group that saw Hannah in one of two milieus but did not see her 
take the test concluded that she was at a slightly higher grade level 
when she was portrayed as middle class.  Those seeing her take the 
test, having been exposed to the middle-class Hannah, scored her a 
full grade-level ahead of the working-class Hannah that the other 
half of the participants watched.45 Again, there was only one film 
of the test-taking. The results were a function of people confirming 
their hypotheses about the relationship between social class and 
educational achievement.  
Confirmation bias has all kinds of legal ramifications, many of 
which have grabbed the attention of legal academics.46 Below are 
three basic lessons for first-year legal writing students.  
First, it is essential that students learn to take opposing 
arguments seriously and to counter them. This often requires them 
to fight the tendency to discount counterarguments as weak, a 
consequence of the confirmation bias. 
Second, students being taught interviewing skills must learn to 
head off the confirmation bias right from the beginning. It is not 
that all clients are liars. Rather, it is that the client’s narrative is 
often an incomplete and somewhat biased account of the facts, 
largely because the client also discounts evidence that tends to 
disconfirm the story.  
Finally, just as confirmation bias leads to “groupthink” in 
business settings, it leads to “groupthink” in litigation settings.47 
                                                          
45 Id. at 24. 
46 See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 261 (2010) (antitrust); Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An 
Examination of Factors that Aggravate and Counteract Confirmation Bias in 
Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. (2009) (criminal 
procedure); Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A 
Behavioral Insight into Securities Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133 (2000) 
(bias by auditors leading to securities fraud); D. Michael Risinger et al., The 
Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden 
Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2002) (scientific 
evidence). There are many others. This is just a small taste of the application of 
confirmation bias.  
47 See Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarz, Adaptation and Resiliency in 
Legal Systems: Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1639 (2011) 
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Litigation teams feed on badmouthing the other side to one 
another, especially in a contentious litigation in which rude 
conduct has developed. This tendency can have very detrimental 
effects on the caliber of representation provided. 
It is certainly not difficult to understand what it means to take 
opposing views seriously, with or without learning about the 
confirmation bias. But, consistent with the theme of this essay, 
exposing students to the psychological mechanisms that could 
inhibit effective writing (and advocacy more generally) may help 
them to internalize the point more fully, and to have a better 
chance of incorporating it into their sense of what it means to 
advocate well from a very early stage in their careers. 
  
C. Controlling the Correspondence Bias 
 
It is bad form in advocacy to replace substantive argument 
based on the facts and the law with ad hominem attacks on the 
opposing party. Consider this federal appellate court’s reaction to a 
prosecutor’s description of a pro se defendant as a “morally 
bankrupt criminal:”48 
That “argument” is, of course, neither relevant to 
our inquiry, nor does it qualify as legal argument. 
Rather, it is a gratuitous ad hominem attack that 
detracts from the persuasiveness of the 
government’s argument as well as the 
professionalism of its presentation. We should not 
have to remind officers of the court that such 
personal comments have little place in an appellate 
brief.49 
The reporters are full of statements in which judges express 
their irritation at this tactic. Whether or not they affect the result of 
an individual case, judges routinely chastise lawyers for engaging 
in such conduct.50 Yet there is something intuitively right about the 
                                                          
(noting that groupthink “can interact with and intensify confirmation bias” by 
regulators). 
48 Pazden v. Maurer, 424 F.3d 303, 317 n.16 (3d Cir. 2005).  
49 Id. 
50 For a few recent examples, see Sabella v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201 (2009); State v. Whitby, 365 S.W.3d 609, 614 
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notion that people will tend to think that a person acts in 
conformity with his character, so that a bad person is more likely 
to do the bad things he is accused of having done than is a good 
person. Psychologists call the tendency to overemphasize the 
extent to which conduct emanates from a person’s character and 
underemphasize the effect of circumstances on conduct the 
correspondence bias.51  
In a classic experiment, psychologists Edward E. Jones and 
Victor Harris showed participants an essay that either supported or 
opposed then-Cuban president Fidel Castro.52 Half the participants 
were told that the authors could take whichever position they 
wished, the other half were told that the authors were assigned 
positions by a debating coach. Both groups of subjects believed 
that the authors’ true attitudes toward Castro were reflected in the 
substance of the essay, although the effect was stronger when the 
participants believed that the author had a choice in the matter.53 
The message conveyed in the essays was that people who support 
Castro do so because they personally approve of him, and people 
who oppose Castro do so because they do not personally approve 
of him, even when they are told that the positions taken in the 
essays were assigned and had nothing to do with the authors’ 
attitudes.  
Over the years, many studies have confirmed this phenomenon, 
which, at one time, was called “the fundamental attribution 
error.”54 The earlier name reflects the observation that people often 
erroneously attribute behavior to the personality of the individual 
and ignore the circumstances in which the behavior occurred. 
                                                          
(Mo. Ct. App. 2012); State v. McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d 739, 752 (Minn. 2010); 
Hildebrandt v. Veneman, 233 F.R.D 183, 183 (D.D.C. 2005); Mapp v. 
Burnham, 800 N.Y.S.2d 137, 147 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005). 
51 See Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 
117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21 (1995). 
52 Edward. E. Jones & Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1967). 
53 Id. at 6. 
54 Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions 
in the Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 173, 183 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977); Gilbert & Malone, supra 
note 51, at 24–25. 
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Much social psychological research over almost half a century has 
pointed toward the fact that people behave differently in different 
social contexts without being aware that they do so. For example, 
Darley and Latané’s 1968 studies examined the circumstances in 
which a bystander is likely to rescue a person in distress.55 A 
participant sat alone in a room with a headset and microphone, 
having been informed that she was participating in a study of how 
students react to the stress of college in an urban environment. The 
experimenter told the participant that she and others would speak 
in turn through their microphones and that they were isolated to 
enable them to remain anonymous. In reality, however, there were 
no other people, only tape recordings of others. In one condition,56 
participants were told that five other individuals would be involved 
in the discussion. In another, the lone participant was told that he 
would be speaking with only one other person. A third group was 
told that three individuals would be participating. 
During the experiment, the participant heard a recording of a 
person represented to be one of the other participants having a 
simulated seizure. When participants thought they were part of a 
group of six, only thirty-one percent of them left the room to tell 
the experimenter of the seizure while it was still occurring. But 
when they thought that the only other participant was the person 
having the seizure, they attempted to intervene eighty-five percent 
of the time.57 Those who thought they were one of three performed 
in the middle.  
Thus, the likelihood of rescue is largely a function of the 
number of available rescuers. The more potential rescuers there are 
the less the likelihood that any particular individual will come 
forward. The situation drives our behavior. Yet if someone told me 
that I would not likely step forward to help if I were in a room 
hearing a person suffer a seizure, I would find that hard to believe. 
I would believe that my character would drive me to, at the very 
                                                          
55 John M. Darley & Bibb Latané, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: 
Diffusion of Responsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.  377 (1968). 
56 Professors John Darley and Bibb Latané conducted a great deal of work 
on the question of bystander intervention, much of which would serve to 
illustrate the point I make here. See BIBB LATANÉ & JOHN M. DARLEY, THE 
UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY DOESN’T HE HELP? (1970). 
57 Id. at 380. 
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least, ask for assistance. In other words, like just about everyone 
else, I am subject to the correspondence bias. Similarly, in judging 
others, only after the significance of the circumstances in which 
they acted is explained to me can I replace my default assumption 
that the participants’ character traits explain their behavior in these 
studies, or what my own behavior would be in real life. 
Like the confirmation bias, the correspondence bias has not 
escaped legal writers. It has been used as an explanation for the 
treatment of falsely convicted criminal defendants,58 cultural 
differences that limit successful mediation,59 causation judgment in 
tort law,60 and judgment about state of mind in securities fraud 
litigation.61 Professor Jon Hanson and his colleagues have written a 
series of articles to explain social phenomena ranging from obesity 
to pornography.62 
Why should legal writing students be taught about all of this? 
The correspondence bias is pervasive and it affects the way one 
interprets a piece of writing. Legal writing students should be 
taught about the workings of the correspondence bias and how 
both to stave it off and to take advantage of it within ethical 
bounds. That is, students should understand that when they tell the 
story of a legally relevant event, readers cannot help but care about 
the character of the characters. Students need not straddle the line 
between making inappropriate ad hominem remarks on the one 
                                                          
58 Adina M. Thompson et al., After Exoneration: An Investigation of 
Stigma and Wrongfully-Convicted Persons, 35 ALB. L. REV. 1373 (2012). 
59 Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: 
Theory and Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281 (2006). 
60 Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors 
Think About Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 
61 (1995). 
61 Victor D. Quintanilla, (Mis)Judging Intent: The Fundamental Attribution 
Error in Federal Securities Law, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 195 (2010). 
62 See, e.g., Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in 
America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645 (2004); Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The 
Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of Human Behavior are 
Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311 (2008); Jon Hanson and David 
Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the 
Human Anima, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The 
Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power 
Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003). 
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hand and ignoring human nature on the other. What they must 
learn to do is to bring the characters in their narratives to life based 
on how they frame the facts. In doing so, students must stay within 
the record, while exploiting their readers’ tendencies to attribute 
behavior to individual personality and character traits. Similar 
strategies can be used to counteract opposing narratives intended to 
exploit the correspondence bias to their clients’ disadvantage.  
All of this has a bit of an odor. Is it unfair to take advantage of 
one’s knowledge of human psychology to gain an advantage in the 
litigation arena? Consider the criminal defense lawyer who 
attempts to create reasonable doubt by using a false defense—the 
creation of a narrative that the lawyer believes to be false, but that 
is consistent with the evidence.63 Is it proper for lawyers to take 
advantage of cognitive biases to create such a false narrative? 
These are hard questions.  Thus, discussion of the correspondence 
bias should not only give students an opportunity to develop subtle 
decision making in their writing but it should also create a very 
useful place in the curriculum to discuss the relationship between 
advocacy, candor, truth-seeking, and legal ethics. 
 
D. We Are All Human, We Are All Biased 
 
Students should be taught that no matter what their self-
impression may be, we are all subject to these biases. There is a 
very interesting psychological literature on how we tend to 
acknowledge cognitive biases in others but are blind to them in 
ourselves. A few lessons from these writings would serve students 
well.  
In a series of studies, psychologist Emily Pronin and her 
colleagues have demonstrated that people recognize the biases 
discussed in this essay, but think that they are largely immune from 
them or at least more immune from them than the average 
                                                          
63 For different perspectives on this practice, see Lawrence M. Solan, 
Lawyers as Insincere (But Truthful) Actors,” 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 487 (2012). See 
also MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 48 
(1975); Carl Selinger, The “Law” on Lawyer Efforts to Discredit Truthful 
Testimony, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 99 (1993); William H. Simon, The Ethics of 
Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1717–19 (1993).  
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person.64 Consider the following statement, which should resonate 
with students and faculty alike: 
Psychologists have claimed that people show a 
“self-serving” tendency in the way they view their 
academic or job performance. That is, they tend to 
take credit for success but deny responsibility for 
failure; they see their successes as the result of 
personal qualities, like drive or ability, but their 
failures as the result of external factors, like 
unreasonable work requirements or inadequate 
instruction.65 
Students who participated in this study acknowledged their 
susceptibility to this bias, but believed that they were less 
susceptible than the average American,66 and less susceptible than 
their classmates.67 Thus, we acknowledge our weaknesses, but still 
conclude that each of us is above average when it comes to 
overcoming cognitive bias.68  
Why do we underestimate the extent of our bias blind spot? 
Emily Pronin and Matthew Kugler explain it in part by referring to 
“the introspection illusion.”69 When we think of the conduct of 
others, we evaluate what they have done. But when we think of our 
own conduct, we evaluate the history of the thinking that led us to 
behave as we did. Harvard undergraduates participating in Pronin 
and Kugler’s study first replicated the task of the study just 
                                                          
64 See Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perception of Bias in Self 
and Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369 (2002) [hereinafter 
Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot]. 
65 Id. at 370 (citation omitted). 
66 Id. at 371. 
67 See id. at 371–72. 
68 The “Better than Average Effect” is not simply an artifact of Garrison 
Keeler’s fictional Lake Woebegone. It is actually a widely studied phenomenon.  
See, e.g., Mark D. Alicke et al., Personal Contact, Individuation, and the Better-
than-Average Effect, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 804 (1995); Jonathan 
D. Brown, Understanding the Better-than-Average Effect: Motives Still Matter, 
38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 209 (2012).    
69 Emily Pronin & Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring 
Behavior: The Introspection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 565, 566 (2007). 
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described70 and then were asked what information they used in 
assessing their own bias and that of classmates. Once again, the 
participants attributed more bias to others than to themselves, 
demonstrating the bias blind spot. Moreover, they reported using 
different information depending on whether they were explaining 
their own bias or the bias of others. With respect to understanding 
their own bias, the participants accepted the explanation “trying to 
‘get inside my head’ . . . to find evidence of the sorts of thoughts 
and motives that could underlie this tendency.”71 In contrast, they 
explained the greater perceived bias of their classmates by 
“considering how well this description fits the way that people in 
general tend to behave.”72  
These results should not surprise us. Recall accounts of the 
financial scandals arising from the 2008 financial sector collapse. 
There was a huge gap between the statements of the insiders 
talking about their good intentions on the one hand and the public 
perception of what they actually did on the other.73 That gap is the 
result of the self-serving bias and the introspection illusion 
reinforcing one another.74 Moreover, this inability to judge one’s 
own cognitive state has been applied directly to the difficulty of 
being self-aware about one’s own writing. Bryan Garner writes 
that inexperienced lawyers, who have not yet developed their 
writing skills, are less likely to be aware of their deficits.75 Garner 
refers to the work of psychologists Justin Kruger and David 
Dunning, who put it this way: 
[W]hen people are incompetent in the strategies 
                                                          
70 See Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot, supra note 64. 
71 Pronin & Kugler, supra note 69, at 567–68. 
72 Id. 
73 For a good description, see MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE 
DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010).   
74 I have, for purposes of this essay, not described the full range of 
mechanisms that psychologists propose to explain these and related phenomena. 
The reader interested in pursuing further analysis might turn to the excellent 
discussion of the relevant literature in Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye 
of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 
PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 782–87 (2004).   
75 See Bryan A. Garner, Why Lawyers Can’t Write, A.B.A. JOURNAL, Mar. 
1, 2013, available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
why_lawyers_cant_write/.  
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they adopt to achieve success and satisfaction, they 
suffer a dual burden: Not only do they reach 
erroneous conclusions and make unfortunate 
choices, but their incompetence robs them of the 
ability to realize it.76 
That is, not being good at a particular task often implies not 
knowing how bad we are at that task. The experimental results are 
dramatic. In one study, participants (undergraduate students at 
Cornell) answered questions from the logical reasoning section of 
an LSAT preparation guide. They then predicted how well they 
had done in comparison with other people taking the same test. 
Those in the bottom quartile, with an average of being in the 12th 
percentile, predicted as a group a mean of being in the 68th 
percentile.77  
This lack of awareness applies to writing skills as well. As 
Kruger and Dunning describe: 
The skills that enable one to construct a 
grammatical sentence are the same skills necessary 
to recognize a grammatical sentence, and thus are 
the same skills necessary to determine if a 
grammatical mistake has been made. In short, the 
same knowledge that underlies the ability to 
produce correct judgment is also the knowledge that 
underlies the ability to recognize correct judgment. 
To lack the former is to be deficient in the latter.78 
Thus, in one of their studies, Kruger and Dunning tested 
participants on grammatical knowledge using twenty questions 
taken from a National Teacher Examination preparation guide. The 
results were the same as in the study discussed above: those 
participants who scored in the bottom quartile overestimated how 
well they did compared to others. Although they scored in the 10th 
percentile on the average, they assessed themselves as being in the 
61st percentile.79 Subsequent experimentation showed this low-
                                                          
76 Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of it: How 
Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-
Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1121 (1999). 
77 Id. at 1125. 
78 Id. at 1121–22. 
79 Id. at 1125–26. 
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scoring group to be especially unable to reassess their skills even 
after looking at the performance of others.80  
This essay does not suggest that legal writing students must go 
through an exercise in demoralization by learning that their lack of 
skill is matched only by their lack of self-awareness. However, it is 
important that students be taught the ease with which we tend to 
underestimate the shortcomings in our reasoning and skills 




I have described in this essay the reasons to expect legal 
writing students to benefit from learning about the psychological 
processes that underlie basic legal writing skills. This knowledge is 
apt to help students to internalize what they learn, creating a 
greater likelihood that they will be able to transfer the skills to 
situations outside the writing class itself. I have then described four 
psychological lessons worth learning, and have explained why this 
is so. What I have not done, however, is to make specific 
suggestions about how to go about this. That is the subject of this 
brief Conclusion.  
Before doing so, however, I wish to note that the four lessons 
from psychology discussed here are by no means the only ones 
from which legal writing students may benefit. Surely legally 
relevant psychological discoveries extend beyond these. For 
example, the self-serving bias, discussed earlier in connection with 
Pronin and Kugler’s experiments on the bias blind spot, should be 
of interest to lawyers and to law students learning how to write 
persuasively. Daniel Medwed’s essay in this volume illustrates this 
point well.81 The hindsight bias is another good candidate for 
integration into the legal writing curriculum. This widely discussed 
phenomenon82 is defined as “the tendency for people considering a 
                                                          
80 See id. at 1126–27. 
81 See Daniel S. Medwed, The Good Fight: The Egocentric Bias, the 
Aversion to Cognitive Dissonance and American Criminal Law, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 
137 (2014) (discussing how self-serving bias applies in legal educational and 
professional settings).  
82 See, e.g., Jay J.J Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The 
Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
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past event to overestimate their likelihood of having predicted its 
occurrence.”83 This, too, has made its way to discussion by legal 
academics.84 Like the correspondence bias, it is a pitfall that 
students should learn to avoid. 
In my experience, students are very engaged when they 
themselves participate in surveys, the results of which are then 
discussed in class. Clickers work well for me.85 Students are 
required to “click in” their answer to a multiple choice question 
projected in the classroom on a Power Point slide. Each student’s 
answer is anonymous, but the students are required to answer the 
question. Once they have responded, the distribution of responses 
is projected in the form of a bar graph. Discussion follows. 
Clickers are not necessary, but for some of the tasks described in 
this essay, some means of projecting the problems in the classroom 
probably is.  
Without devoting too much classroom time, it should be both 
useful and strategic to do the following: 
1. Present students with examples from the 
Oppenheimer study on what makes writers 
appear to be smarter.86 Get their reactions and 
share them with the class. Then, compare what 
they say to what Oppenheimer found, and 
                                                          
DECISION PROCESSES 147 (1991); Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The 
Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 104 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE, 288–99 (1975). 
83 Hal R. Arkes et al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 305, 305 (1988). 
84 For an excellent example of this discussion, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A 
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 
(1998).  
85 There is a substantial literature on the use of clickers in the classroom, 
both in legal education and more generally in higher education.  See, e.g., Paul 
L. Caron & Rafael Gely, Taking Back the Law School Classroom: Using 
Technology to Foster Active Student Learning, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 551, 559–61 
(2004) (discussing use of handheld wireless transmitters to foster active learning 
in law school classes); Richard E. Mayer et al., Clickers in College Classrooms: 
Fostering Learning with Questioning Methods in Large Classrooms, 34 
CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 51 (2009) (discussing the usefulness of handheld 
wireless transmitters in large lecture courses). 
86 See supra notes 29–36 and accompanying text. 
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discuss. It is possible, of course, to substitute 
materials from legal writing texts that contain 
before and after examples.87 Those instructors 
who would rather use materials in which the 
complexity involves syntax as well as word 
selection may especially wish to do so. 
2. Present students with the Wason card task.88 
Have them respond and discuss their results in 
terms of what it shows about the confirmation 
bias. Then describe to them the Darley and 
Gross study and discuss their reaction. Ask the 
students about instances in which they have 
been unreasonable in rejecting evidence that 
does not seem to support their views on say, 
politics. 
3. Present students with Darley and Latiné’s 
results in the experiment in which the 
participant thought she was one of six people 
hearing a seizure and did not go to the victim’s 
rescue.89 Ask them what they think of that 
participant. Then tell them about the other 
groups and ask them what they think of her 
then. Finally, discuss with the students how the 
correspondence bias can be used for and against 
unsympathetic parties, raising ethical issues 
about using such knowledge about psychology. 
4. Present students with Pronin et al.’s studies 
about the self-serving bias and the bias blind 
spot.90 Present them with the range of their 
responses and discuss the difficulty we have in 
recognizing in ourselves what we criticize in 
                                                          
87 See, e.g., GARNER, supra note 27, at 17–45 (presenting many examples 
of unnecessarily complex language); POLLMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 294–
305 (presenting examples directed at making writing more concise). 
88 See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
89 See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. It is not necessary to 
show a video, as the original experimenters did.  One can find appropriate 
images by looking at “girl taking an exam” on Google Images, for example. 
90 See supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text. 
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others. Apply this to the legal contexts in which 
the biases discussed above have legal relevance, 
especially the confirmation bias, through which 
lawyers are apt not to take opposing views 
seriously enough to be effective advocates. 
5. Develop materials, either in addition to or 
instead of the above suggestions, based on other 
psychological phenomena, such as the self-
serving bias or the hindsight bias. 
All of this can be done in course segments that last 15–30 
minutes apiece. It should be well worth the time.  
